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Abstract
Contrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to
sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply,
but  relative  to  others,  it  may  not.  This  article  explores  contrastivism
about the central normative concepts of reasons and ought. Contrastivism
about reasons says that a consideration may be a reason for an action A
rather than one alternative, B, but may not be a reason for A rather than
some other alternative, C. Likewise, contrastivism about ought says that
it might be that you ought to perform action A rather than action B, while
it is not the case that you ought to perform  A rather than some other
alternative,  C.  It  explores  the  shape  and  motivations  for,  and  the
relationship between, these contrastivist theories. 
Nearly  everyone  accepts  that  in  ethics,  and  normative  philosophy  more  generally,
alternatives matter. Whether what you did was wrong, or was what you ought to have done, or
whether you even had any reason to do it, depends on what the alternatives were. Suppose you
run into the burning building, scoop up Tiny Tim, and carry him out to safety. Is this what you
ought to have done? Maybe so. But what if an alternative, one that you could have just as easily
performed, was to run in, scoop up both Tiny Tim and Tiny Tom—who was right next to Tiny
Tim—and carry both of them to safety? If this was an alternative, what you did was not what you
ought to have done. If this was not an alternative, what you did may well have been what you
ought to have done. So the claim that alternatives matter is uncontroversial,  in the following
sense: the availability of certain alternatives can affect the normative status of an action.
The focus of this article is on a much stronger and much more controversial sense of the
claim that alternatives matter.  Contrastivism about  normative concepts (specifically,  ought  or
reasons) says that the normative status of an action can vary with the particular alternatives to
which we are comparing the action.1 According to contrastivism about ought, even holding fixed
the available  alternatives,  whether you ought  to perform some action can still  vary with the
particular comparison we are making. For example, even if driving, taking the bus, and biking
are all available alternatives, it  may be that you ought to take the bus, when compared with
driving, but not when compared with biking. Similarly, according to contrastivism about reasons,
whether  some  consideration  is  a  reason  for  you  to  perform  an  action  can  vary  with  the
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comparison. It may be that the fact that decreasing fuel consumption is good for the environment
is a reason to take the bus when compared with driving, but not when compared with biking.
These  examples  may sound uncontroversial.  The  controversial  contrastivist  claim is  that  all
reasons, and all oughts, are relativized to sets of alternatives.
This article is an overview of contrastivism about reasons and  ought. It describes the
shape of the theories, as well as discussing motivations and challenges. Finally, it investigates the
relationship between the contrastivism about reasons and contrastivism about ought.
1 Contrastivism
First I will describe contrastivism about reasons and ought at a general level. In the following
two sections, I will present some arguments for contrastivism.
Contrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of mutually
exclusive, but not necessarily jointly exhaustive, alternatives. A common contrastivist claim is
that the target concept is  question-relative. This is to appeal to the conception of questions as
partitions over parts of logical space, or equivalently, as sets of alternatives.2 Relative to one
question, the concept may apply, while relative to another, it may not apply.
Contrastivism about reasons and ought can be thought of in  this way. In the case of
reasons and ought, the questions are what we will call normative questions, or question of what
to do.3 The alternatives in the set  are mutually exclusive options  (at  least  in deliberative,  as
opposed to evaluative, cases), which need not include every possible option, and not even every
option open to the agent.4 Relative to some normative questions, it may be true either that you
ought to A or that some consideration is a reason for you to A, but relative to others it may be
false. When you ought to A relative to a normative question, A is the answer to the question of
what to do. When some consideration is a reason to  A relative to a normative question,  that
consideration bears on the question, and in particular supports A as the answer.5
Sometimes the normative question will be provided explicitly. For example, if I ask, “So,
should we go to the Dining Room, the One Under, or Maisha for dinner?”, and you reply, “We
ought to go to the Dining Room”, your claim will be most naturally interpreted relative to the
normative question consisting of the options I mentioned. On a natural contextualist version of
contrastivism,  the  normative  question  relative  to  which  ought and  reason  ascriptions  are
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interpreted will be provided by the context, if it’s not provided explicitly. In any deliberative or
evaluative context (at least ones in which we are discussing what someone ought to do, what
ought to be the case, or what reasons someone has), some options will be relevant, and they will
constitute the normative question.
This appeal to a contextually relevant deliberative question is not ad hoc. Linguists and
philosophers of language have given independent arguments that our theory of communication
needs to appeal to a contextually salient question under discussion to properly interpret much of
our discourse. For example, to interpret prosodic focus (e.g., intonational stress), it is standard in
linguistics to appeal to the question under discussion. Similarly, we can use the question under
discussion  to  help  explain  the  notion  of  a  relevant conversational  contribution,  as  one  that
addresses the question under discussion.6 In normative contexts,  this question is  a normative
question that consists of options. The crucial linguistic claim the contrastivist makes, then, is that
reason and ought ascriptions are interpreted relative to this question and that as this question
varies, what you have reason to do or what you ought to do may likewise vary.
This brings out an important distinction between two kinds of contrastivist theses. We
may accept contrastivism merely as a linguistic thesis, about (some) claims involving the word
‘reason’ or the word ‘ought’. This is the thesis that these claims are to be interpreted relative to a
set of alternatives, and are only true or false once a set is supplied. Or we may accept a deeper
contrastivist thesis, that the concepts of a reason and of ought themselves are relativized to sets
of alternatives. That is, the concepts only apply or fail to apply to some action and agent relative
to a set of alternatives, or normative question. In principle we could accept only one of these
theses—e.g.,  we may think only that  ‘reason’ and ‘ought’ should get  a  contrastive semantic
treatment,  though  the  important  normative  concepts  themselves  are  fundamentally  non-
contrastive. In this article, I will primarily have in mind the deeper, conceptual thesis. But some
of the arguments I discuss will most directly support the linguistic thesis; I will simply assume
that these arguments provide at least indirect support for the conceptual thesis, since a reasonable
default picture is one on which we use the words ‘reason and ‘ought’ to talk about reasons and
what  agents  ought  to  do.  More  generally,  at  times I  will  have  to  be  a  bit  sloppy with  this
distinction, and assume that linguistic points have bearing on the conceptual theses.
So far I have focused on the contrastivist claim that reasons and oughts are relativized to
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sets of alternatives, or questions, that may not include every option open to the agent—that the
sets are non-exhaustive. But there is a second important feature. The options in the set must be
individuated at some level of detail; they may be individuated in a more or less fine-grained way.
For example, one normative question may be {stay home, go out} while a more fine-grained one
is {stay home and cook, stay home and read, go to the store, go to the gym}. The contrastivist
holds that, just as reasons and oughts are relativized to sets that can differ in which options they
include, the sets can also vary in how those options are individuated.7
1.1 Contrastivism about ought
Contrastivism about reasons and  ought is the thesis that that  these concepts  are question- or
alternative-relative. This structural thesis leaves a lot of latitude in giving a substantive theory of
reasons and ought. Here is perhaps the simplest contrastive theory of ought.
Contrastive Ought: Agent S ought to perform action A relative to normative question Q iff
A is the best alternative in Q.
This lets us see very clearly why it may be that  S ought to  A relative to one question but not
relative to another. This can happen as long as A is the best alternative in the first but not in the
second. So, on this simple picture, ought inherits its contrastive character from the contrastive, or
comparative, character of best—to be best is clearly to be best out of some set of alternatives.8
The  idea  here  is  that  there  is  a  contrast-invariant  ranking  of  alternatives,  and  any
particular  ought will  be relativized to a subset of those alternatives. But the alternatives will
retain their relative ranking in the subset. A more extreme version of contrastivism would do
away with the contrast-invariant ranking, and allow the ranking itself to vary with the particular
alternatives.  For example,  we may say that relative to {A,  B,  C},  A is ranked above  B,  but
relative to {A, B, D}, B is ranked above A. But this would be a radical view which would, among
other things,  require us to deny a version of the principle  of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Further, the arguments that contrastivists have used to motivate their theories do not
support this more extreme version of contrastivism.
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But given that the version of contrastivism in Contrastive Ought is relatively moderate,
the  contrastivist  should  articulate  advantages  of  contrastivism  over  a  more  standard,  non-
contrastive semantics for ‘ought’, as developed by Kratzer (1981), and other writers following
her  (here  is  one  place  where  I  am  being  sloppy  with  the  linguistic/conceptual  distinction).
According to this view, to simplify a bit, ‘ought’ is relativized to (i) a modal base—i.e., a set of
worlds that corresponds to the relevant information in the context, and (ii) an ordering source,
which delivers a ranking of those worlds. ‘You ought to A’ then means that the highest-ranked
worlds are ones in which you A. The question, then, is whether the advantages of contrastivism
can simply be mirrored by the standard semantics by, for example, restricting the modal base so
that only the alternatives the contrastivist would put into the normative question are taken to be
available.
Some contrastivists have offered variations on the simple picture. For example, Cariani
(2013) allows for cases in which you ought to A out of Q, even though A is not itself a member
of Q. What is required (among other conditions) is that A is visible to Q, where A is visible to Q
when A perfectly partitions the alternatives that are in Q. That is, each alternative in Q is one in
which the agent As or one in which the agent does not A—there is no alternative such that the
agent can perform it either by A-ing or by not A-ing. This allows Cariani to appeal to fewer shifts
in the set of alternatives in interpreting ‘ought’ claims, and especially in explaining inferences
between ‘ought’ claims. This gives Cariani an advantage over the standard Kratzerian account,
because he is able to get by with fewer context shifts, which allows him to more easily allow for
inferences between ‘ought’ claims. Some inferences that the Kratzerian would have to treat as
strictly speaking equivocal, because the ‘ought’ claims are relativized to different modal bases,
Cariani can treat as perfectly legitimate. But Dowell and Bronfman (forthcoming) have recently
objected to Cariani’s account—and in particular the features of that account that give it these
advantages—in favor of a more orthodox Kratzerian account.
1.2 Contrastivism about reasons
Just as in the case of ought, accepting contrastivism about reasons leaves room for various more
or less substantive theories of reasons. We may follow reasons primitivists like Scanlon (1998),
Parfit (2011), and Dancy (2004) and hold that all we can really say to elucidate the notion of a
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reason is that reasons count in favor of the things they are reasons for. Here is a contrastivist
version of reasons primitivism:
Contrastive  Reasons Primitivism:  Consideration  r is  a  reason for  agent  S to  perform
action A relative to normative question Q iff r favors S’s A-ing relative to Q.
If  the  contrastivist  follows  reasons  primitivists  and  identifies  the  reason  relation  with  the
favoring relation, and holds that there isn’t more to say, this is the view she ends up with.
One  problem with  this  theory  is  that  it  leaves  us  without  an  explanation  of  certain
relationships between reasons relativized to different sets of alternatives. For example, if  r is a
reason for A relative to Q, then it seems that r should also be a reason for A relative to a subset of
Q that  contains  A.  But,  as  far  as  Contrastive  Reasons  Primitivism goes,  we  just  have  two
different  sets,  Q and Qʹ,  which happens to  be a  subset  of  Q.  Since the favoring relation is
contrast-relative, we have no reason to think there will be any particular relationship between
reasons relativized to these different sets.9
Contrastivism is also compatible with a non-primitivist view, according to which we can
usefully  analyze  the  concept  of  a  reason.  Here  is  a  more  substantive  view,  which  analyzes
reasons in terms of the notions of explanation, promotion or respect, and objectives:
Contrastive  Reasons  Substantive:  Consideration  r is  a  reason  for  agent  S to  perform
action A iff r explains why S’s A-ing better promotes or respects some objective O than
any other alternative in Q.
Different  theorists  will  have different  views about what the objectives are,  the promotion or
respect of which explains our reasons. They may be the objects of desires of the agent, objective
values like justice or goodness, or something else.
We can weaken this theory by changing ‘better’ to ‘at least as well as’, or by changing
‘any other alternative’ to ‘at  least  one alternative’.  Different choices here will  give different
verdicts  in  particular  cases,  as  well  as  have  important  implications  about  the  relationships
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between reasons relative to different sets—e.g., whether a reason to A out of Q is also a reason to
A out of a subset of Q that contains A. If we adopt the strong version of the theory in Contrastive
Reasons Substantive, we will secure this entailment. If we adopt the weakest version, that A-ing
only has to promote or respect O more than some other alternative in Q, we will not secure this
entailment, since the subset of Q may not include the alternatives that promote or respect O less
well than A.10
Now that we have seen the shape of contrastive theories of reasons and  ought, we are
ready to see some arguments for these theories.
2 Contrastive Reason Ascriptions
One straightforward  argument  for  both  contrastivism about  reasons  and  contrastivism about
ought is that it  best explains certain patterns of acceptable ascriptions of those concepts. 11 In
particular,  contrastivism  can  easily  make  sense  of  explicitly  contrastive ascriptions.  In  this
section I will focus on contrastive ascriptions of reasons, but similar arguments can be used to
motivate contrastivism about ought. (Again, I am assuming that arguments showing that reason
ascriptions are contrastive provides at least indirect support to the deeper, conceptual thesis, and
not only the linguistic thesis.) Consider the following pair of ascriptions:
(1) The fact that the book is due back today is a reason for you to take it back to the library
rather than leave it on the shelf.
(2) The fact that the book is due back today is not a reason for you to take it back to the
library rather than send it to the library with me.
The acceptability of (1) and (2) at least prima facie show that whether the fact that the book is
due back today is a reason for you to take it back to the library can vary with the comparison
being made. Since this is exactly what contrastivism about reasons claims, the contrastivist can
explain the acceptability of (1) and (2) easily. The non-contrastivist, though, holds that whether
some consideration is a reason for an action cannot vary with the particular comparison being
made. So the acceptability of (1) and (2) present a puzzle for the non-contrastivist.12
To  resist  this  argument,  non-contrastivists  have  to  provide  analyses  of  explicitly
contrastive ascriptions like (1) and (2) which do not require contrastive reasons. For example, the
non-contrastivist may offer the following analysis:
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NCR: r is a reason to A rather than B iff r is a stronger reason for A than for B
The reasons referred to on the right side of  NCR are non-contrastive. Moreover, this seems to
offer a reasonable interpretation of (1) and (2).
One problem for this non-contrastive approach is linguistic: this proposal does not give a
particularly plausible interpretation of the phrase, ‘rather than’. NCR interprets ‘rather than’ as
meaning ‘stronger than’. But this is not what ‘rather than’ means in other uses. Consider, ‘We’ll
go  to  Los  Angeles  rather  than  San  Francisco’,  ‘We  need  a  mathematician  rather  than  a
philosopher’, and ‘Two plus two equals four rather than five’. In all of these uses, the ‘rather
than’ clause should be understood just as making explicit the particular comparison being made,
just as the contrastivist says. None of these claims is plausibly understood as involving a hidden
‘stronger than’.13
This  problem  gets  more  serious  if  the  non-contrastivist  extends  this  maneuver  to
contrastive ascriptions of ‘ought’, like ‘You ought to take the bus rather than drive your SUV’.
This is because these claims are not plausibly understood as involving ‘stronger than’ in any way,
since  ought,  unlike  reasons,  does  not  have  strength  or  weight.  It  is  an  overall,  rather  than
contributory or pro tanto, concept.14
So the non-contrastivist who proposes an analysis like  NCR is committed to an ad hoc
interpretation  of  ‘rather  than’ in  reason  ascriptions.  Considerations  of  compositionality  tell
against this: in general, we should not assign the same expression different meanings in different
linguistic contexts.
The contrastivist claims that the failure of initially plausible non-contrastive analyses of
contrastive ascriptions shows that we should take claims like (1) and (2) at face value, and adopt
a contrastive view of reasons. The non-contrastivist, on the other hand, can try to come up with
other non-contrastive analyses. There are also general concerns about the cogency of arguments
to radical conclusions about the structure of normative concepts that are based on ordinary usage
of the terms that express those concepts. We might, for example, just think that our ordinary talk
about reasons is sloppy in various ways, and does not really illuminate the true structure of the
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concept, as the contrastivist holds.
3 Arguments from the Puzzles of Deontic Reasoning
In this section, we will see some arguments for contrastivism about ought that are based on the
theory’s ability to solve puzzles that have plagued theories of deontic reasoning.
Deontic reasoning, for our purposes, is reasoning with ought. As deontic logicians and
moral philosophers have known for a long time, deontic reasoning faces a range of puzzles.15
Contrastivists about ought have shown how contrastivism can be applied to solve these puzzles.
Here I will discuss just one.
To appreciate  the  puzzles,  and  the  contrastivist  solutions,  we need to  see  where  the
puzzles  come from. As it  turns  out,  many of them can be traced back to  the  same initially
plausible inference rule:
Inheritance: If you ought to do A, and doing A entails doing B, then you ought to do B.
This rule is confirmed by lots of ordinary deontic reasoning, and is also validated by the standard
semantics and logic of ought. But as is well known, Inheritance lies at the center of many puzzles
of deontic reasoning.16
A representative  puzzle  comes  from Jackson (1985).  Imagine  the  following dialogue
taking place:
(A) Lucretia ought to use less painful poisons against her enemies.
(B) Lucretia ought to use painless poison against her enemies.
(C) Lucretia ought to use political means rather than poison to achieve her goals.
(D) Lucretia ought to give up those goals and instead devote her time to helping the
needy.
Each of these claims seems true, at least when initially uttered. But note that if Inheritance is a
good principle of deontic reasoning, they cannot all be true. For example, the truth of (C) implies
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that  Lucretia  does  not  use  poison.  This  implies,  via  Inheritance (and  the  overwhelmingly
plausible assumption that this is not a case of a moral dilemma) that both (A) and (B) are false.
So the puzzle is to explain how each of these could be true, at least when initially uttered.
There are various ways a non-contrastivist may try to do this. But the contrastivist can
reject Inheritance, and do so in a principled way. According to contrastivism about ought, oughts
are  relativized  to  potentially  non-exhaustive  sets  of  mutually  exclusive  alternatives.  On  the
simple contrastivist picture that Jackson (1985) develops—essentially, Contrastive Ought, from
above—to say that you ought to A out of a set Q is to say that A is the best alternative in Q.17 If
some alternative B is not even in Q, then it makes no sense to say that you ought to B out of Q—
B cannot be the best alternative in Q if it is not in Q at all.18 Thus, if it ought to be that A out of
Q, and A entails B, then it cannot be true that it ought to be that B out of Q. So the only way we
could  make  an  Inheritance-style  inference,  on  a  contrastivist  theory,  is  to  shift  the  set  of
alternatives between the premises and the conclusion. But this looks more like equivocation than
good reasoning.
Once we reject Inheritance, the puzzle presented by (A)–(D) dissolves—or at least, there
is no obstacle to the joint truth of these claims. Moreover, the contrastivist can also explain why
all  of these claims seem true, when initially uttered.  Each is  relativized to a different set  of
alternatives. Since the set of alternatives to which ought is relativized to need not be exhaustive,
different  oughts can be relativized to sets that include different options. For example, on the
reading on which it is true, (A) is plausibly relativized to a set like {Lucretia uses less painful
poisons, Lucretia uses more painful poisons}. For (B), we plausibly have {Lucretia uses painful
poisons, Lucretia uses painless poisons}.
This is a satisfying explanation of what is going on in the dialogue. In some sense, later
claims seem to change the subject.19 It would be reasonable, for example, for the utterer of (A) to
reply to (B), “Oh, sure. I wasn’t considering that as an option”, rather than to take there to be any
kind of genuine disagreement. This is further confirmation for the contrastivist thesis that ought
is relative to some set of alternatives that need not include all the possible options.
Arguments that what agents ought to do can vary not only with what options are included
in the set but also with how those options are individuated are similar. They focus on cases in
which a more fine-grained ought, like ‘You ought to mail the letter’, is true while a more coarse-
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grained one, like ‘You ought to mail the letter or burn it’, is false.20 If Inheritance were true, the
first claim would clearly entail the second, since mailing the letter entails mailing or burning it.
But since the contrastivist can reject this principle, she can avoid puzzles like this.
A very important issue facing contrastivists who reject Inheritance is that they then owe
us explanations of all of the unobjectionable inferences that this principle supports.21 As we have
seen, the most straightforward contrastivist theory rejects Inheritance, because any inference it
supports must rely on a shift in the set of alternatives—if A entails B, then A and B cannot be in
the same set of alternatives, since they are not mutually exclusive. The diagnosis of the puzzle
cases is that they rely on an illicit shift like this, and so are equivocal. But even good inferences
that  Inheritance  supports  will  have  to  rely  on  a  shift,  and  so  would  seem  to  be  equally
equivocal.22
4 A General Normative Contrastivism?
We have seen how to motivate and develop both contrastivism about reasons and contrastivism
about ought. A very plausible claim is that what an agent ought to do depends in some way on
her reasons. In particular, some version of the following principle is widely accepted:
Ought Most Reason: Agent S ought to perform action A iff S has more reason for A than
for any other alternative.
So there is plausibly a very tight connection between the concept of a reason and the concept
ought.
This  observation  makes  it  very  natural  to  ask:  what  is  the  relationship  between
contrastivism about  reasons and contrastivism about  ought?  In particular,  does  adopting one
force us, or at  least put rational pressure on us, to adopt contrastivism about the other? For
example, we might contrastivize Ought Most Reason as follows:
Contrastive OMR: S ought to A out of Q iff S has most reason to A out of Q
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This  is  a  relatively  small  departure  from  the  non-contrastive  Ought  Most  Reason,  and
incorporates both contrastivism about reasons and contrastivism about ought.
In some ways this kind of general normative contrastivism (that is, contrastivism about
both reasons and ought) is theoretically attractive. In a deliberative context, for example, the
deliberating agent would be faced with a deliberative question—a set of alternatives—out of
which she must decide what she ought to do. This deliberation will  involve considering her
reasons for and against options in the set. And it will conclude in a judgment about what she
ought to do, out of that set. Since we are cognitively limited agents, it is very plausible that most
of our deliberation involves consideration of just a subset of all the possible options open to us,
and at  some more  or less coarse-grained resolution.  So, since reasons and ought  are  central
concepts for deliberation, a general normative (or at least deliberative) contrastivism is broadly
attractive.23
Nevertheless,  we can  instead  choose  to  adopt  contrastivism about  only  one  concept,
reasons or ought, but not the other. For example, we may pair a contrastive account of ought with
a  non-contrastive  account  of  reasons  as  follows.  As before,  ought is  relativized  to  a  set  of
alternatives, and the alternative you ought to perform out of a set is the alternative which ranks
highest in that set. This ranking of alternatives is provided, on this picture, by the reasons for and
against  each  alternative.  Crucially,  these  reasons  are  non-contrastive.  Just  as  the  simple
contrastive theory, Contrastive Ought, appealed to a contrast-invariant betterness ranking, we can
appeal to a contrast-invariant ranking based on non-contrastive reasons. One kind of motivation
for this picture is the attractiveness of the idea that reasons are provided by general normative
principles, perhaps something like Ross’s (1930) prima facie duties, which are not sensitive to
the specific comparisons we are making in a situation, though ought does inherit the contrastive
or comparative character of ‘best’, or ‘most’.
We could also adopt a contrastive theory of reasons without adopting a contrastive theory
of  ought, as follows. We accept some version of contrastivism about reasons, presented above.
So  we  can  accommodate  the  apparent  contrast-sensitivity  of  reasons-talk  (as  well  as  other
arguments for contrastivism about reasons). Moreover, we can allow a tight connection between
your reasons and what you ought to do, as in  Ought Most Reason. The twist is that when it
comes to determining what you ought to do, we are only concerned with your reasons relative to
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some privileged set of alternatives—perhaps the set of all the options open to you, partitioned in
a way such that all morally (or epistemically, or prudentially, etc.) distinctions are respected. So
what you ought to do—non-contrastively—is what you have most reason to do relative to this
privileged set.
Both of these mixed theories are reasonable. Thus, though there is some broad theoretical
attraction to a general normative contrastivism, it is not forced on us by accepting contrastivism
about one concept or the other.
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1  I will follow the literature and use ‘ought’ (without quotes) to talk about the concept expressed by the word ‘ought’, 
e.g., “Contrastivism holds that ought is contrastive”.
2 See Hamblin (1958) and Higginbotham (1996) for this conception of questions. See Schaffer (2007) for the connection 
between contrastivism about knowledge and questions.
3 In his recent defense of a contrastive theory of ‘ought’, Cariani (2013) calls these deliberative questions. But I want to 
reserve ‘deliberative question’ for a special kind of normative question, to be contrasted with evaluative questions, 
which will also count as normative questions.
4 For the most part I will treat options as actions. But to make sense of purely evaluative uses of ‘ought’, e.g., ‘There 
ought to be world peace’, we may need to treat the alternatives in the set as propositions. We can then unify the theory 
by treating an action as, roughly speaking, the proposition that the agent performs the action. Compare Cariani (2013) 
and Finlay and Snedegar (2014).
5  Compare Hieronymi (2005) on reasons as considerations that bear on a question. Let me emphasize that the alternatives 
in the set—the potential answers to the normative question—are options, not claims about what you ought to do; i.e., 
{go to the store, go to the gym}, not {I ought to go to the store, I ought to go to the gym}. 
6 In the linguistics literature, see Rooth (1992) and Roberts (2012); see also Schaffer (2005b, 2008) and Finlay and 
Snedegar (2014).
7 See Cariani (2013). This is Yalcin’s (2011) notion of resolution-sensitivity.
8 Compare Sloman (1970) and Finlay (2009, 2014).
9 One way to avoid this problem would be to hold that the favoring relation is non-contrastive, and analyze the reasons 
relation in terms of degrees of favoring, in a way that mirrors what I’ll say below about Contrastive Reasons 
Substantive. This would not be a version of reasons primitivism, since we would analyze the contrastive reason relation 
in terms of a distinct non-contrastive favoring relation.
10 See Snedegar (2014a).
11 This is a popular style of argument for contrastivism about a whole range of concepts. See, for example, van Fraassen 
(1980) (explanation), Schaffer (2005b, 2007, 2008) (knowledge), Schaffer (2005a) (causation), Blaauw (2012) (belief), 
and Sinnott-Armstrong (2012) (free will).
12 See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), Chapter 5, for lots of examples like (1) and (2), deployed in defense of contrastivism 
about reasons.
13 Compare the arguments in Schaffer (2008). See also Snedegar (2013) for more discussion of non-contrastive analyses of 
reason ascriptions like (1) and (2).
14 Some oughts, e.g., moral oughts, may be more important than others, e.g., oughts of etiquette. But these differences are 
not relevant for these kinds of cases.
15 Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to give relevant work in deontic logic the discussion it deserves. For an 
accessible overview, see McNamara (2008). For some brief remarks on the relationship between contrastivism and some 
work in deontic logic, see Snedegar (2014b). I am using ‘deontic reasoning’ as opposed to ‘deontic logic’ because I am 
more concerned with ordinary inferences we make using ‘ought’, as opposed to formal logical systems, even though 
those systems are very plausibly attempts to formalize our ordinary deontic reasoning.
16 There is much more precise and detailed discussion of this principle in deontic logic. For some recent work, see Goble 
(2009) and Hansson (2013).
17 See also Sloman (1970) and Snedegar (2012, 2014b).
18  As we saw above, Cariani (2013) rejects this constraint. He thinks it can be true that you ought to A relative to Q, even 
if A is not in Q. This is legitimate on his theory because he does not accept the simple view that what you ought to do 
relative to a set of alternatives is just the best alternative in the set—his account is more sophisticated.
19 That this is a good way to describe what’s going on provides at least weak confirmation for contrastivism, since (i) 
contrastivism says the ‘ought’ claims are relativized to sets of alternatives, thought of as the contextually salient 
normative question, and (ii) the conversational concept of a topic is nicely understood in terms of such a question under 
discussion. See Roberts (2012).
20 This example is adapted from Ross (1941).
21  Not all applications of contrastive ideas require us to reject Inheritance. See, for example, Horty (2001), Cariani, 
Kaufmann, and Kaufmann (2013), MacFarlane (2014), Wedgwood (manuscript), and Cariani (forthcoming). All of these 
approaches have in common the implementation of a decision problem, or set of options, in the semantics of ‘ought’. 
This puts these theories within the contrastivist camp. Exploring the motivations and challenges of these decision-
theoretic approaches is essential for a full treatment of contrastivism about ought, but I do not have the space to do that 
here.
22 For two different contrastivist attempts to solve this problem, see Cariani (2013) and Snedegar (2014b).
23 See Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) for an argument that contrastivism about reasons is the best explanation of the contrastive 
quality of several other concepts that are intimately related to reasons, including ought, knowledge, and explanation.
